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Investment arbitration in the energy sector
In what circumstances is an investor entitled to compensation under the Fair 
and Equitable Treatment standard of protection in the Energy Charter Treaty 
as a result of the exercise by the states of the right to regulate to detriment of 
investors? A special analysis on photovoltaic arbitration cases in Italy, Spain and 
the Czech Republic. 
Abstract: A significant development in the renewable energy field has happened in several countries like 
Italy, Spain and the Chez Republic over the last years mainly due to the state´s support for renewable 
energy projects. However, because of the financial crisis, these countries decided to review and change 
the policies. As a result of the changes implemented renewable investors were affected in some manner. 
Consequently, many arbitrations claim against these states have been brought under the Energy Charter 
Treaty. The present Chapter analyses this jurisprudence. Based on the results of these arbitrations the lack 
of consistency results evident. Different interpretations around the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard 
and how to find a balance between the need for a stable and predictable investment framework and the 
sovereign right to regulate are the principal cause of diverse decisions. The concept of the standard in 
the treaty is reviewed and compared with the evolution of the concept in other investment agreements. 
In conclusion, possible amendments to increase consistency in the arbitrations under the Energy Charter 
Treaty will be proposed.
Key words: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Legitimate Expectations, Investment Arbitration, Energy Charter 
Treaty, Regulatory Changes.
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Arbitraje de inversión en el sector energético
¿En qué circunstancias un Inversor tiene derecho a recibir una compensación en 
el marco de la provisión de Tratamiento Justo y Equitativo del Tratado de la Carta 
de Energía como consecuencia del ejercicio del Estado de su derecho regulatorio 
en detrimento de los inversores? Análisis de casos de arbitraje de inversiones en 
el sector fotovoltaico en Italia, España y República Checa.
Resumen: Un desarrollo importante de las energías renovables ha ocurrido en países como Italia, España y 
República de Checa en los últimos años, principalmente debido al apoyo del estado a proyectos de energía 
renovable. Sin embargo, debido a la crisis financiera, estos países decidieron revisar su marco regulatorio. 
Como resultado de los cambios implementados, los inversores en el sector renovable se vieron afectados. 
En consecuencia, demandas de arbitraje de inversiones contra estos estados se han presentado al amparo del 
Tratado de la Carta de la Energía. El presente Capítulo analiza esta jurisprudencia. En base a los resultados 
de los arbitrajes se evidencia la falta consistencia en los laudos arbitrales. Las diferentes interpretaciones 
en torno al estándar de Tratamiento Justo y Equitativo y a cómo equilibrar la necesidad (para el inversor) 
de un marco de inversión estable y predecible y el derecho soberano (del Estado) a regular, son la causa 
principal de las diversas soluciones. El concepto del Estándar de Tratamiento Justo y Equitativo en el Tratado 
se revisa y se compara con la evolución del concepto en otros tratados de inversión. En conclusión, se 
propondrán posibles enmiendas para aumentar la certeza en los arbitrajes de inversiones presentados al 
amparo del Tratado de la Carta de la Energía.
Palabras clave: Tratamiento Justo y Equitativo, Expectativas Legítimas, Arbitraje de Inversiones, Tratado 
sobre la Carta de Energía, Cambios Regulatorios.
Arbitragem de investimento no setor energético
Em que circunstâncias um investidor tem o direito de ser compensado no âmbito 
do tratamento justo e equitativo previsto no Tratado da Carta de Energia, em 
consequência do exercício do Estado do seu direito regulamentar em detrimento dos 
investidores? Análise de casos de arbitragem de investidores no setor fotovoltaico 
em Itália, Espanha e República Checa.
Resumo: Ocorreu um desenvolvimento importante das energias renováveis em países como a Itália, 
Espanha e República Checa, principalmente devido ao apoio do Estado a projetos de energias renováveis. 
No entanto, devido à crise financeira, estes países decidiram rever o seu marco regulatório. Em 
resultado das alterações introduzidas, os investidores no setor das energias renováveis foram afetados. 
Consequentemente, foram apresentados pedidos de arbitragem de investimentos contra estes Estados 
com o amparo do Tratado da Carta da Energia. O presente capítulo analisa esta jurisprudência. Com base 
nos resultados das arbitragens, verifica-se a falta de consistência nas sentenças arbitrais. As diferentes 
interpretações entorno do tratamento justo e equitativo e a forma de equilibrar a necessidade (para o 
investidor) de um quadro de investimento estável e previsível e o direito soberano (do Estado) de regular, 
são a principal causa das diversas soluções. O conceito de padrão de tratamento justo e equitativo no 
tratado é revisto e comparado com a evolução do conceito em outros tratados de investimento. Em 
conclusão, serão propostas possíveis alterações para aumentar a certeza nas arbitragens de investimentos 
apresentadas com o amparo do Tratado da Carta da Energia.
Palavras- chave: Tratamento Justo e Equitativo, Expectativas Legítimas, Arbitragem de Investimentos, 
Tratado sobre a Carta de Energia, Mudanças Regulatórias.
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1. Introduction and background
Investment in electricity generation from renewable energy sources is rarely considered 
to be financially viable without state support (Selivanova, 2018, p.433). The principal aim 
of which is to cover projects high investment costs and encourage sustainable generation. 
Furthermore, the energy sector is characterized by the existence of long-term contracts 
(Mistelis, 2018, p.153). The reason for this is that energy projects involve large sums of 
capital investment and the use of technology that generally has a long useful life (Scherer, 
2018, p.14). The application by a state of significant changes to these schemes or to the 
legal framework which governs a renewable energy investment –after a project has been 
constructed– may affect the investor’s expectations to receive a reasonable return on their 
investment and to recover costs (Selivanova, 2018, p.433). 
Investors often seek guarantees that the legal framework in which an investment is 
made will remain stable during the entire term of the contract. However, from the state’s 
perspective, it is a challenge to grant the freezing of the legal regime which governs the 
sector during such a long period of time. The existence of conflicting interests between 
both parties –investors and states– is, therefore, a fact. This, in some cases, gives rise 
to disputes. That occurred during the financial crisis due to the over-subsidisation 
phenomenon. Consequently, several states reversed some of the benefits initially 
conceded to photovoltaic investors through schemes (Gallagher, 2018, p.250). Investors 
in photovoltaic energy decided to invest considering a legal framework which was 
subsequently changed in some way. When the changes that occurred in the regulation 
did not have an impact on the terms of the business conducted by the investors, the 
consequence is irrelevant. However, when the changes affect the economic equation of 
the business, investment arbitration appears as the main tool for the investors (Charles 
A., 2019, “Investment Disputes Involving the Renewable Energy Industry under the 
Energy Charter Treaty”, Global Arbitration Review).
The state’s right to regulate and modify the existing legal framework –once the 
investment was made– is not under debate. It constitutes an exercise of the principle of 
state sovereignty, according to which it has right to regulate in its domestic jurisdiction 
(Charanne v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, Final Award, 2016, para. 449-503; Charanne 
v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, Partial Dissenting Opinion, 2015, para. 11; Eiser. v. 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36 (2017) Final Award, para.362; Blusun v Italy Final 
Award, 2016, para. 317,367 y 372; Antaris v Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-01 Final 
Award, 2018, para. 360 y Antaris v Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-01, Dissenting 
Opinion of Gary Born, 2018, para. 39).
However, certain limits should be imposed on the state’s right to regulate domestic 
matters if such regulations adversely affect the foreign investor’s –previously 
made– investments (Selivanova, 2018, p.433). It has been argued that undertakings 
or representations that a state has made to attract renewable investments might –in 
specific situations- create ´legitimate expectations´ for the investors (Graham, 2018, 
p.221). Although certain tendency seems to be appearing in case-law, there is still not 
a jurisprudence constante regarding this matter. The breach by states of the legitimate 
expectations of the investors is being considered by some arbitral tribunals (for instance: 
Eiser v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017; Infrastructure v. Spain, ICSID Case No. 
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ARB/13/31, 2018; Masdar v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, 2018, and CEF 
v. Italy, SCC Case No. 158/2015, 2019) as a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard of protection (“FET”) under the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT” or Treaty). Article 
10(1) of the ECT provides that: “Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such 
conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors 
of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment”. Nevertheless, other tribunals –in 
analogous situations- rejected claims regarding the breach of the FET provision, invoking 
similar arguments (Charanne v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012 Final Award (2016) para. 
486-492; Blusun v Italy Final Award, 2016, para. 395). 
In what circumstances is a foreign investor entitled to compensation under the FET 
in the ECT as a result of the exercise by the states of the right to regulate to detriment of 
investors? Significant development has occurred on the case-law from Charanne to-date, 
and no comprehensive research has been conducted on this evolution, this Chapter seeks 
to fill this gap and contribute to the literature. Recommendations made could be useful for 
arbitral tribunals’ in future renewable energy disputes. Besides, some amendments will 
be proposed in the drafting of the ECT considering the different interpretations around 
the FET concept. In addition, the progress some International Investment Agreements 
have experienced in the manner how the standard is defined will be considered.
This Chapter will be divided into five sections. The first sets the context with a brief 
introduction to the ECT from a theoretical perspective. It is focused on the FET provision 
and the dispute resolution mechanism in the treaty (1). The second consist of an analysis 
of the renewable case-law under the ECT concerning states’ right to regulate (2). The 
third section presents the conflict between a state’s right to regulate and investor’s 
legitimate expectations. Different approaches to solve this conflict, identified in case-law, 
will be presented (3). Some thoughts on stabilization clauses in energy contracts and 
the impact they had and might have in future disputes will be presented (4). The final 
section concludes with closing remarks (5).
The state has the sovereign right to regulate and modify its legal framework. 
Nevertheless, there are limits to the exercise of such power. In case the state goes beyond 
these limits, a breach of the FET standard under the ECT occurs. Therefore, a new right 
appears for the investor who is entitled to receive compensation. A new discussion   –not 
subject to analysis herein- opened in the literature about the impact these cases might 
have in the Energy Transition (Tienhaara K., 2008, p. 24).
2. Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty
2.1. History, Purpose and Modernisation  
Since the ECT was ratified by several states, investments in the energy sector have 
experienced an increase in the substantive protections. The Treaty emerged in a fossil fuel 
setting because of a gas supply crisis occurred during the period of the cold war. Although 
it has been argued that its modernization is required, it is the most broadly ratified 
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investment agreement applicable to energy investments and the unique multilateral 
treaty exclusively related to energy (Gallagher, 2018, p.256). It provides investment 
substantive protections, including a dispute settlement mechanism. The Treaty addresses 
a varied range of aspects related to energy, namely: commerce; investments (promotion, 
protection and treatment); energy efficiency, and environment. 
The treaty’s purpose is “to establish a legal framework to promote long-term 
cooperation in the energy field” (Article 2 of the ECT, 1998). Thus, according to its 
preamble, the aim of the Treaty is to encourage economic growth through the adoption 
of measures to liberalise investment and trade in the energy sector (preamble of the ECT, 
1998). The preamble should not go unnoticed, as it constitutes a tool of interpretation in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). As the Treaty 
does not contain a clear definition of the FET, its preamble is used by tribunals as an 
interpretation tool to determine its content and scope. The disputes reviewed below 
raised ´alleged breaches´ of some of the substantive protections of the Treaty. Since the 
treaty does not contain a clear definition of the scope and content of these protections, 
an exercise of interpretation is required to unravel their meanings.
2.2. FET Standard of Protection and Customary International Law 
While the substantive protections are examined –either by the literature or tribunals–, 
the concepts of ´investor´ and ´investment´ always draw attention. The reason for 
this is simple. These concepts define the scope of application of the treaty protections 
determining the jurisdiction ratione materiae and personae of the tribunal in case of disputes. 
The definition of investment can be found in Article 1(6) of the Treaty (Article 1 of the 
ECT, definition of “Investment”). Moreover, according to the Treaty, to be categorized 
as an investment, the activity done by the investor must be associated with an economic 
activity in the energy sector (An interesting discussion about this could be find in this 
case: Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award, 
2008, para. 42-43). Besides, Article 1(5) defines ´economic activity in the energy sector´ 
comprising the construction and operation of power generation facilities including 
those powered by wind and other renewable energy sources. Therefore, in principle 
the disputes arising out of renewable energy projects –such as the examined herein- are 
covered by the ECT provisions (Gallagher, 2018, p.257). Regarding the concept of investor, 
it is defined in Article 1(7) of the Treaty which, in comparison with other investment 
agreements, is considered broad.
Section III of the Treaty contains the substantive protections for investments. It covers 
the protections usually found in Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), such as FET 
standard of protection; prohibition of discriminatory measures; Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment, and payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for any 
nationalization or expropriation. The most frequently successfully invoked substantive 
protection -in renewable energy disputes raised out of regulatory changes- is the FET 
standard of protection (Dolzer, 2012, p.1; McLachlan, 2017, p. 355-357). Most of the claims, 
as will be exposed, are based on the states failure to provide a stable and transparent 
regulatory environment in light of the investor’s legitimate expectations (Cyrus, 2017, p.2).
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Article 10 (1) of the ECT sets an obligation for the contracting parties to accord FET 
standard of protection to investors without including a definition of the standard. 
Consequently, investors often include claims for breaches of the duty of FET in addition 
to claims brought under other substantial protections. It’s been argued that investment 
treaties –like the ECT- are not self-contained regimes (McLachlan, 2017, p. 296-329). 
Consistently, the meaning of their terms must be interpreted considering the relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties in accordance with 
Article 31(3) of the VCLT. However, it has been asserted that defined by traditional means 
of interpretation (wording, context, object and purpose) the FET concept is challenging 
(Schill, 2012). Hence, the lack of definition and the absence of an unanimously accepted 
meaning from state practice, determine the exercise by tribunals of a significant law-
making power in international investment law (Schill, 2012, p.1). Although there is not 
precedent in Investment-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) (Cheng (2017) p.1014), Arbitral 
Awards have become a persuasive authority –at the time of defining the content of the 
standard- giving raise to what has been called ́ normative expectations´(Schill, 2012, p.1). 
It implies that all stakeholders involved in an investment dispute (state, investor, counsels) 
expect that the tribunal decide future cases consistently with previous decisions. This 
flows into the idea that investment treaties will and should be applied and interpreted 
in the future based on how they were applied and interpreted in the past (Schill, 2012, 
p.1). As will be reported, this tendency is not completely followed in the analysed cases 
where prima facie inconsistency seems to be the rule (Oliver, 2007, p. 225-243).
Notwithstanding the above debate, while the FET standard continues being part of the 
ECT, it will require to be interpreted. Concerning the link between FET and customary 
international law, there is an extensive debate among authors. It is mainly focused 
on whether the standard of protection is part of the Minimum Standard of Treatment 
provided to foreign investors in customary international law or if it includes a broader 
meaning. 
There is a consensus in jurisprudence that stability and predictability of the legal 
framework are important components of the FET provision under the ECT. Some 
authors have argued that the ECT confers investors operating in the energy field greater 
protections against regulatory changes than other investment treaties (Hober, 2018, p.175). 
This statement is based on Article 10 (1) of the Treaty which refers to a state duty to create 
stable and transparent conditions for foreign investments, as well as the commitment 
to accord Fair and Equitable Treatment to such investments. Dolzer and Schreuer have 
identified from the arbitral case law, factual situations or principles to which this standard 
has been applied. These are: transparency; stability and the protection of legitimate 
expectations; compliance with contractual obligations; procedural propriety and due 
process; good faith, and freedom from coercion and harassment (Dolzen, 2012, p. 1).
It is accepted that a reversal of promises by a state that have led to legitimate 
expectations in the investors will breach the FET standard (Azurix v Argentine, ICSID 
Case No ARB/01/12, Final Award, 2006, para. 287; Glamis v United States of America, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, 2009, para. 22). Thus, the issue to be addressed is what makes 
an investor’s expectation capable of being considered ́ legitimate´. Legitimate expectations 
are examined in accordance with the host state’s legal framework, undertakings, 
and representations made directly or implicitly by the host state (Levashova, 2019, 
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International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 50 (Kluwer Law International, 2019). 
The legal framework on which the investor is entitled to rely consists of legislation and 
treaties, assurances contained in decrees, licences, as well as contractual undertakings 
(Dolzen & Schreuer, 2012, p. 1). In addition, tribunals have agreed that investor’s 
legitimate expectations must be analysed in the light of the legal order of the host state 
at the time the investor made the investment (Mondev v. United States of America, ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Final Award, 2002, para. 156; and AES Summit v. The Republic 
of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Final Award, 2010, para 9.3.8 and 9.3.18). It 
was noted that legitimate expectations are not subjective hopes and perceptions, rather, 
they must be based on objective facts (Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. 
and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision 
on Liability, 2010, para. 228).
It was pointed out that “changes to general legislation, in the absence of specific 
stabilization promises to the foreign investor, reflect a legitimate exercise of the host state’s 
governmental powers that are not prevented by a fair and equitable treatment standard” 
(Total S.A. v. Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 2010, para. 
164). However, what must be considered is whether measures exceed normal regulatory 
powers and fundamentally modify the regulatory framework for the investment beyond 
an acceptable margin of change (El Paso v. Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Final 
Award, 2011, para. 402).
The legitimate expectation and the proportionality criteria are the main tools applied 
by tribunals in the case-law to evaluate whether the host-state breached the FET provision 
under the ECT. In the following paragraphs, after a special consideration of the dispute 
resolution mechanism under the ECT, an analysis of the determination tribunals have 
done around this concept will be conducted.
2.3. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
International arbitration is the principal tool used by investors under the ECT in case 
of violation of its substantive protections. The procedures and circumstances under which 
an investor of a contracting party might submit an investment dispute to International 
Arbitration are set in Article 26 of the ECT (Gaillard, 2018, p. 1). The Treaty contemplates 
a cooling off period of three months from the request of amicable settlement. After this 
period, the investor is entitled to choose to submit the dispute for resolution either 
to the courts or administrative tribunals of the contracting party to the dispute, or in 
accordance with a previously agreed dispute settlement procedure or to International 
Arbitration. Article 26 of the ECT clearly grants this choice to the claimant as it states that 
if the dispute cannot be amicably settled, “the investor party to the dispute may choose 
to submit it for resolution” (Gallagher, 2018, p. 262). Thus, under the ECT it is only at the 
investor’s instigation that arbitration can be commenced. The text of the Treaty differs 
significantly from other treaties which provide that a dispute may be submitted at the 
request of either party to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal or arbitration under the auspices of 
ICSID (See the Article 9(3) of the China-Ethiopia BIT, 1980). Therefore, a fork in the road 
provision is contained in the Treaty that potentially bars an investor’s claim if another 
dispute-settlement mechanism has been selected (Gaillard, 2018, p.1). Moreover, the 
Treaty gives right to any party involved in the dispute to set as a place of arbitration a 
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state that has ratified the New York Convention, which reaffirms the enforceability of 
the award (Article 26 (5) (b) of the ECT). This is notwithstanding the debate in cases 
of intra-European Union investment arbitration awards which will not be examined 
herein (Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2008-13, 2008). 
Therefore, International Arbitration constitutes a guarantee for the investor. Point was 
made that it would be of little benefit to foreign investors if they were obliged to enforce 
their rights under investment treaties in the local courts of the host state responsible 
for their mistreatment, since often the action complained of is a change in the local law 
the relevant court is obliged to uphold (King, 2012, p. 1). The investor is also afforded 
a wide choice in terms of institutions and rules which can have a significant impact on 
its claim (Article 26 (4) of the ECT).
The above overview lays the foundations for the analysis of renewable energy 
arbitration disputes in the next chapter.
3. Renewable ECT Arbitrations and Investors’ Legitimate 
Expectations  
3.1. Regulatory changes and context of its implementation      
Political risk has always been a problem for renewable energy investors. An exponential 
growth in renewables has occurred across the world–especially in Europe- during the 
last decade. The growing focus on renewable energy was reflected in the creation of 
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). IRENA is an intergovernmental 
agency. Its principal objective in accordance with the Article II of its Statute is to “promote 
the widespread and increased adoption and the sustainable use of all forms of renewable 
energy”. The reasons for this can be found either at a domestic or an international level. 
Concerning the latter, -through treaties- several commitments were taken on by states 
to reduce green-house gas (GHG) emissions to combat climate change (CC) (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed in 1992 and 
entered into force in 1994; Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2015). Since then, 
they intended to reproduce the assumed international obligations in their domestic 
jurisdictions. Consequently, different supports were given at a local level to incentivize 
renewable development. For instance, Feed-in-Tariffs (FIT); Feed-in Premiums; green 
certificates; quota obligations; loans, and tax exemptions. The FIT regime resulted in a 
tariff deficit, meaning that the subsidies the government was paying to the operators 
of photovoltaic parks were higher than the end-price the government charged for that 
energy. Conversely, because of the financial crisis and over-subsidisation, several states 
decided to modify the policies connected with the granted supports (Gallagher, 2018, 
p. 257). In general, the regulatory modifications implemented by the states comprised 
cutbacks on subsidies for renewable energy; creation of new taxes; implementation of 
a state levy on solar energy, limitation of the term for regulated tariffs; imposition of 
limits on equivalent production hours; obligation to fulfil new technical requirements; 
obligation to pay a charge for grid access, and the reversal of the prioritised dispatch 
(Restrepo, 2017, p. 8). Therefore, renewable investors who invested based on a regime 
that was then modified were affected in some manner. Subsequently, several investment-
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arbitration claims against host-states -mainly Spain, the Czech Republic and Italy- have 
been brought under the ECT provisions.
The fact is that these countries adopted measures to comply with their international 
obligations to reduce GHG. It was the global financial crisis that made the measures 
unsustainable. There are those who argue that tribunal decisions should take the global 
intention to lower GHG emissions into account and consider the international instruments 
supporting this aim (Restrepo, 2017, p. 8). However, this approach is not considered 
in the Awards reviewed here. This confirms that Tribunals have little room to review 
international law on climate change. Some concerns have been expressed about the impact 
the awards may represent to the aim of combating Climate Change (CC) (Restrepo, 2017, 
p. 8). The main concern is that it may incentivize host-states not to take CC measures to 
avoid the risk of facing high value claims and eventually, adverse decisions (Restrepo, 
2017, p. 8). This phenomenon is well- known in literature as ´regulatory chill´ (Baetens, 
2011, p.11). Nevertheless, there is no evidence about its occurrence, which must be 
evaluated over the next few years when pending cases are finished and in relation to 
the subsequent conduct of states (Tienhaara, 2018, p.24). 
3.2. Tendencies and Unsuccessful Allegation of Indirect Expropriation     
It is a fact that the FET is the most successful substantive protection in the studied 
cases. As explained, the modification of renewable regulation in Spain, the Czech 
Republic and Italy resulted to date in sixty international arbitration claims under the 
ECT (See list of all arbitrations filed against Italy, Spain and The Czech Republic in 
THE ect database: https://energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/all-
investment-dispute-settlement-cases/). Investors’ who were affected as a consequence 
of the regulatory changes seek protection under the substantive provisions of the ECT 
by means of investment arbitration. This means that, currently, sixty out of one hundred 
and twenty-two disputes brought under the ECT are related to the modification of 
renewable’ regulations in the mentioned countries. 
Firstly,  forty-five of  these claims are against  Spain;  six (Charanne; 
Isolux;Antin;Eiser;Masdar;Novenergia) of them have been resolved and the awards are 
publicly available; two (Charanne &Isolux) concluded that Spain is not liable to pay 
damages and the remaining four considered it is (Antin;Eiser;Masdar & Novenenergia). 
The regulatory changes that motivated investors’ claims were different in Charanne and 
Isolux -cases decided in favour of the state- in comparison with the regulatory changes 
considered in Antin; Eiser; Masdar; Novenergia -decided in favour of the investor. The 
existence of different regulations on which the claimants based their claims and the 
different impact they caused in the investors’ business seem to be prima facie the principal 
reasons for different Awards (Kudrat, 2018, p. 5).
Secondly, nine of these claims are against Italy; three (Blusun; CEF & Greentech) of them 
have been resolved and the awards are publicly available; one concluded that Italy is 
not liable to pay damages (Blusun) and the other two considered it is (CEF & Greentech).
Thirdly, six (Antaris; Voltaic; Photovoltaik; WA; ICW; ICW) of these claims are against the 
Czech Republic; five (Antaris; Voltaic; Photovoltaik; WA; ICW) of them have been resolved 
concluding that the state is not liable to pay damages.
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Hence, out of a total of fourteen awards publicly available, eight have been decided 
in favour of the host-state and six in favour of the foreign investor. However, the 
jurisprudence changed significantly since the first Award was rendered in Charanne. 
The vast number of pending cases against Spain and extra official information accessible 
about the non-publicly available awards suggest that this tendency would be probably 
modified rapidly (Tones, 2019).
As was asserted, under the ECT different wording cannot serve as an explanation 
for divergent interpretations (D’Agostino, 2007, p.50). However, the above tendencies 
show how tribunals have achieved different conclusions considering similar facts and 
a unique Treaty. 
From the reviewed awards emerges that substantive protections under which most 
of the investors presented their claims in the hypothesis of regulatory changes were the 
FET-standard and Indirect Expropriation. In the case of the claims against Spain, four of 
the investors claimed jointly a violation of the FET-standard and indirect expropriation 
(Charanne; Eiser; Isolux  ; & Novenergía,), while two investors (Antin; Masdar) merely 
claimed a breach of the FET-standard. Concerning the claims filed against Italy, from 
the awards follow that merely one of the investors claimed jointly a violation of the 
FET-standard and Indirect Expropriation (Blusun), while two only claimed exclusively 
a breach of the FET-standard (CEF & Greentech). Regarding the claims filed against 
the Czech Republic, follows that all the investors claimed solely a violation of the FET 
standard (see the following Final Awards: ICW, para.125; Photovoltaik, para.124; Voltaic, 
para.125; WA para. 125). Consequently, the above figures show that the FET standard 
is preferred by the investors to base their claims in case of regulatory changes by host-
states. In addition, there is no case in which the investors invoked exclusively indirect 
expropriation. In terms of the awards’ outcomes, it flows that all the cases decided in 
favour of the investors (ICW; Photovoltaik; Voltaic; WA; Antin; Eiser; Novenergia; Masdar; 
CEF; and Greentech) the state liability was determined based on a breach of the FET-
standard. Thus, considering the above analysis, the FET standard is not only the most 
preferred standard by the investors to base their claims on, it is also the most successful 
of them.
Although indirect expropriation is not subject to analysis herein, some brief assertions 
will be done regarding the cause of its unsuccessful allegation. In Charanne the Tribunal 
pointed out that the concept of expropriation is generally accepted as ́ a taking involving 
a deprivation of property´ (Charanne v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, Final Award, 
2016, para 460). The tribunal followed the standard of indirect expropriation under 
international law, which requires the presence of a substantial effect on the property 
rights of the investors (Charanne v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, Final Award, 2016, 
para 461). It was pointed out that a loss of value considered as expropriation must be 
of such magnitude as to amount to a deprivation of property (Charanne v. Spain, SCC 
Case No. V 062/2012, Final Award, 2016, para 464). Consequently, it was concluded 
that the claimants failed to prove that the disputed measures had an effect tantamount 
to an expropriation (Charanne v. Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, Final Award, 2016, 
para 462). This conclusion reflects the high threshold in jurisprudence to consider that 
government measures amounted to an expropriation (Blusun v Italy, Final Award, 2016, 
para 408 & Greentech Energy Systems A/S, et al v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 2015/095 
Final Award (2018), para. 727).
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Normally, in renewable energy cases involving adverse regulatory measures -as the 
studied herein- investors remain in ownership of the affected investment, nonetheless 
the investment has suffered a loss of value due to the regulatory changes implemented. 
In the facts the investor continues operating the photovoltaic park which continues to 
generate energy, and thus profit.
In this sense, the Isolux Tribunal determined the non-occurrence of expropriation 
after comparing the profitability of the investor at the time of investing with the current 
profitability of the solar plants. Being the latter higher, the tribunal concluded that ´in 
no way can a “severe” or “radical loss” occurred concluding the not expropriator nature 
of the measures adopted by Spain (Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case 
V2013/153, Final Award, 2016 para. 852-853).
3.3. FET as a protection against Host-State Regulatory Changes
The allegation of a breach of the FET by investors in the cases is followed by a response 
of the states denying such breach. The main arguments presented by both parties will be 
presented here-after. As was pointed out, state support has been a necessary precondition 
for investments in renewable projects (Selivanova, 2018, p.433). Although currently 
renewables are becoming quite competitive, when they were trying to compete at the 
beginning with a very entrenched fossil fuel industry, they faced many challenges. Some 
of them were inertia to change, high capital costs, and lack of appreciation of the urgency 
of climate change mitigation (Outka, 2012, p. 65).
There is consensus that the reversal of supports by host-states that had led to legitimate 
expectations in the investors would violate the FET standard under the ECT (Dolzer, 2012, 
p.1). However, as will be exposed, there is no general agreement, neither in literature 
nor in jurisprudence, about when the investor has a legitimate expectation that the legal 
framework would not be modified. Thus, the key legal issue to be addressed is what 
makes an investor’s expectation liable to be considered ‘legitimate’ (Tellez, 2012, p.27). A 
review of the investors’ and host-states’ assertions about this concept will be conducted 
in the following paragraphs. 
The rationale behind investors’ claims is the idea that the regulatory modifications 
introduced by states have affected the legal and economic regime established by previous 
regulation, on which they relied at the moment of making their investments (Selivanova, 
2018, p.433). They asserted that the changes caused damages and thus it must be repaired 
(Tellez, 2012, p. 27). By means of a Treaty interpretation and referring to several case-law, 
investors alleged that the FET standard imposes an obligation for the states to maintain 
a stable and predictable legal framework (Charanne v Spain, Final Award,, 2016, para. 
293). They likewise affirm to have a legitimate expectation that the legal framework 
considered when investing would not be modified (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, 
para. 294). They pointed out that, via regulatory reforms, states breached their obligations 
to provide FET under Article 10 (1) of the ECT. The investors mostly recognized that 
states -as part of their sovereign power- are permitted to change their regime under the 
ECT, but those changes must be predictable and in line with investors’ expectations 
(Antin v Spain Final Award, 2018, para. 414 & 377). To justify the existence of a legitimate 
expectation, the criteria usually used –which is commonly accepted in jurisprudence- 
consist of identifying certain elements in the conduct either of the state or the investor. 
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These elements are an explicit or implicit representation made by the authorities of the 
state (about the freezing of the legal framework); such representations must be relied by 
the investor at the moment of investing, and the legitimacy and reasonableness of the 
expectations at the light of the circumstances of the cases. Regarding the representations 
made by states, investors alleged that mostly are contained in the legislation –whatever 
form it adopts (Charanne v Spain, 2016, Final Award para 295). In addition, could be 
identified -apart from the legislation- in other type of evidence, such as press release; 
declarations made by public officials; meetings with government representatives, and 
publicity through which the state promotes the investment  such as the Spain campaign, 
´The sun can be yours´(Antin v Spain, 2018, Final Award, para. 366). In some cases investors 
alleged that the promise of stabilization was indirectly contained in the legislation, while 
others -going beyond this argument- affirmed that a stabilization clause with a specific 
commitment of freezing the legal framework was expressly contained in the legislation 
(Ivaylo, 2018). 
Conversely, the rationale behind host-states’ responses is that although the FET 
standard provides that a stable regulatory framework must be granted to investments, 
this does not imply that the legal system must be unmodified. The idea that the FET 
standard is not a stabilisation clause is repeatedly alleged by states. It was affirmed that 
they can continue to legislate responding to changing circumstances if they do so in an 
equitable and reasonable manner (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, para. 355). States 
alleged that the violation of legitimate expectations requires a specific commitment that 
the legal framework that governed the investments would not be modified (Charanne 
v Spain Final Award, 2016, para. 356). Thus, in absence of a specific commitment, the 
only expectation that the investor would have is that the legal framework would be 
modified. Host-states stated that investors’ expectations must be objective, reasonable 
and legitimate. To determine their scope, they observe what knowledge the investor 
had or should have had about the regulatory framework in the country in which the 
investment was done (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, para. 364). Therefore, they 
asserted that what makes a state measure reasonable is the public interest pursued by it 
(Antaris v Czech Republic Final Award, 2018, para. 354). Thus, the adjustments to the legal 
framework are considered by states to be coherent and reasonable as they aim to adapt 
to changing economic circumstances and solve the problem of tariff deficit responding 
to a public interest (Antaris v the Czech Republic Final Award, 2018, para. 365).
While setting a general overview of the arguments presented either by investors or 
host-states, tribunal determinations on the subject will be examined in the following 
section. The strength of the arguments presented by both parties is unquestioned. 
Beyond their arguments, some principles could be identified. Behind states’ arguments, 
the principle of sovereignty (Byers, 2002, p.47) and the public interest exception appear as 
a main ground. The principle of sovereignty has been defined as “the full power of the 
state in its territory and its independence from other states” (Feshenko, 1988, p.40). This 
power includes the ability of the state to create their own legislation and to modified it 
when circumstances so required. This idea governs the states´ arguments the in the cases 
under study. Alternatively, in some dissenting opinions of the cases under study, some 
argue that while there is a right to regulate, it does not forgive a state of its obligation to 
compensate (Charanne v Spain Dissenting Opinion Guido Tawil, 2015, para 5 & Antaris 
v Czech Republic Dissenting Opinion Gary Born, 2018, para. 7). Conversely, it has been 
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pointed out that a compensation requirement would discourage regulation and without 
forgiveness of liability, the right to regulate could not exist (Giest, 2017, p.18). 
In addition, the public interest exception is used by states to justify the regulatory 
changes implemented. It has been argued that generally acknowledged that states need 
to be given some freedom for public interest regulation (Giest, 2017, p.18). And thus, 
public interest exceptions are incorporated into investment treaties to reduce liability 
when the regulation is intended to benefit the public and prevent the chilling of such 
regulation (Giest, 2017, p.18). In the reviewed cases states alleged that the regulatory 
changes implemented responded to a public interest as a result of the financial crisis 
being that an exception to the ECT promise of stability.
However, under investor’s argument, the doctrine of no venire contra factum propium 
or estoppel (Sombra, 2016, p.9) –by which the legitimate expectations rule is influenced- 
is easily recognised. The doctrine of no venire contra factum propium consists of the 
prohibition of disloyal or inconsistent behaviour. It lies in avoiding contradictory 
behaviours regarding previous manifestations of will that are based on good faith and 
that can cause damages (Sombra, 2016, p.9). Similarly, the concept of estoppel in common 
law is related to the protection of the practice of an initial behaviour that results from a 
legitimate expectation that such practice conforms with good faith (Sombra, 2016, p.9). 
At the end, it appears that after a confrontation between state rights to regulate and 
investor legitimate expectations, that who wins the battle will obtain an award in its 
favour. Thus, the decision-maker role that arbitrators play in these cases is not simple. 
This not only because of the strength of the arguments alleged by both parties, but also 
because of a rising concern about the possible interference of international investment 
rules with domestic law (Lise, 2014).
3.4. Tribunal Approaches to FET Standard in the Context of Regulatory 
Changes
Due to the lack of definition of the FET in the ECT, tribunals have interpreted the 
provision differently. There is consensus in the jurisprudence that the duty to provide 
FET implies an obligation to create a stable, equitable, favourable, and transparent 
conditions for investments (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, para. 447). The following 
have been construed by arbitral tribunals as elements of the FET-standard: the legitimacy 
(reasonableness) of investor expectations; the stability, predictability and transparency 
of treatment by the state, and the absence of arbitrariness or discrimination in such 
treatment (Restrepo, 2017, p. 8).
This interpretation is done by means of a literary analysis of the text of the treaty 
in terms of the meaning of the words ´fair´ and ´equitable´, in cooperation with some 
provisions of its preamble in accordance with the criteria defined to interpret treaties 
in the VCLT.
There is also a compromise about the fact that the state cannot induce an investor to 
make an investment generating legitimate expectations, to later ignore the commitments 
that had generated such expectations (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, para. 486). It is 
also accepted that investors’ legitimate expectations come from specific commitments of 
the state, for example those assumed by means of a stabilization clause. Some tribunals 
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understood that in the absence of a specific commitment, an investor cannot have a 
legitimate expectation that existing legal framework will not be modified. However, 
regarding the rules that are not specifically addressed to a particular investor –normally 
designed to encourage foreign investment-, there is no consensus in tribunals about its 
ability to be considered as a source of a commitment of the state. In this sense, some 
have expressed that the existence of a specific commitment – whether of a contractual 
nature, or based on statements or specific terms granted by the host-state– can be based 
on the legal order in force when the investment was made (see Gary Born and Guido 
Tawil dissenting opinions). This installed the discussion about whether a representation 
is valid to create a legitimate expectation in the investor, a debate that makes the lack 
of consistency evident.
The idea that the state has a reasonable degree of regulatory flexibility to face to the 
changing circumstances in the public interest is generally accepted (Eiser v Spain Final 
Award, 2017, para 387. However, those subsequent changes –in case they happen- should 
be made fairly, consistently, and predictably, taking into consideration the circumstances 
of the investment (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, para 500). Nevertheless, in some 
dissenting opinion it’s been argued that if in the valid exercise of that regulatory power 
of the host-state it affects acquired rights or legitimate expectations of the investor, the 
state must compensate the damage caused (Charanne v Spain Dissenting opinion Guido 
Tawil, 2016, para. 11).
There is also consensus regarding the fact that the regulatory measures, to be in 
violation of investors’ legitimate expectations must not have been reasonably foreseeable 
by the investor (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, para 506). To prove this aspect, 
investors use either reports or other type of evidence to support the fact of having 
done a due diligence process before the investment decision to mitigate or avoid any 
type of risk that could appear. This suggests how important the evidence may be in the 
resolution of this cases. Although prima facie the expectation seems to be located in the 
subjective scope of the investors, it is generally accepted by tribunals that the legitimate 
expectation must be proved objectively and assessed on a case-by-case basis (Antin v 
Spain, 2018, Final Award, para. 536). This idea reveals the importance of the realization 
of a due diligence by the investor prior to make the decision to do an investment. This 
is not only to assess possible risks, and eventually mitigate or avoid them, but also 
to pre-establish evidence to be prepared in case of dispute. The expectation is in the 
subjective sphere of the investor who eventually will face the challenge to make visible 
in an objective manner. The investor is who has the burden of proving such expectations, 
thus, as was alleged, the strongest the evidence is, the more likely to obtain an award 
in which the legitimate expectation be recognized (Antaris v Czech Republic, 2018, Final 
Award, para. 368).
There are other aspects that in a case by case basis are analysed by the tribunals when 
assessing a legitimate expectation. For instance, the lifespan of the technology used in a 
project -such as the solar panels-, or the term of the lease agreement for the land above 
which the photovoltaic project is to be built (Charanne v Spain Final Award, 2016, para 
521 & 522). This elements contribute to exteriorize in some way the expectations the 
investor has and the reasonableness of its expectations at the light of the circumstances 
of the projects.
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Some tribunals refer to a test of proportionality when assessing the regulatory changes. 
This test analyses that the modifications are not capricious, unreasonable, arbitrary, 
contrary to public interest, disproportionate or unnecessary, and do not suddenly and 
unpredictably eliminate the essential characteristics of the existing regulatory framework 
(Charanne v Spain, 2016, Final Award para. 517 & 539).
Others refer to ́ an acceptable margin of change´ in the regulation by the states in parallel 
to the ́ margin of appreciation doctrine´ (see dissenting opinion of Gary Born, 2018, para. 39). 
The basic idea behind is that the state is entitled to a certain ‘room to maneuver’, within 
which its conduct is exempt from full-fledged review. Tribunals appear to conclude that 
the state retains a margin of discretion to balance the investor’s expectations against 
public policy objectives and that only the exercise of regulatory power exceeding that 
margin can constitute a breach of a state’s obligations under the treaties’ FET standard.
The Spanish, Czech and Italian renewable energy arbitrations are likely to focus 
on whether the host-state acted with consistency, transparency, and reasonableness in 
modifying the existing regime, and whether investors had legitimate expectations that the 
legal framework would not be modified. As emerges from the tribunals determinations, 
there is not an exclusively standard as to when investors’ expectations deserve treaty 
protection under the FET standard, any evaluation will depend on several aspects, such 
as the facts of the cases, the evidence provided by the parties, the scope of the regulatory 
modifications adopted, and the impact they caused on the investors. The legitimate 
expectations’ rule developed by tribunals as an instrument to assess the breach of the 
FET standard will be explained in detail in the following paragraph. Such analysis will 
bring us a step closer to the answer this Chapter questions.
3.5. What Attributes must an Expectation have to be considered as 
Legitimate?
As was largely argued hereinbefore, it is accepted that a violation of a legitimate 
expectation of the investor would derive in a breach of the FET-standard. Since there 
is no provision in the ECT referring specifically to investors’ legitimate expectations, 
the determination of the extent and content of protection of such expectations is being 
assessed by Tribunals through a review of the relevant case law on the matter (Tellez, 
2010, para. 110).
The lack of rigorous analysis by tribunals supporting the use of legitimate expectations 
is noted in most of the reviewed awards. Some exceptions to this rule are the cases 
against the Argentine Republic (Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Final Award, 2009, para, 260-262; Total S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 2001, para. 113 and El Paso El 
Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Final Award, 31/10/2011, para. 356-364 which contain important analysis of the subject 
matter and are constantly referred by tribunals in the cases under study). 
The doctrine of legitimate expectation has been established on precedents —awards 
citing prior awards that have mentioned the concept. However, as will be explained, 
this approach without additional elaboration is unsatisfactory. The rationale behind the 
legitimate expectations doctrine is that the investor should not be protected from the 
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ordinary business risk of an investment, and that the expectations of the investor must 
have been reasonable and legitimate in the context in which the investment was made. 
The logic behind the rule is to encourage foreign investors to make adequate business 
decisions based on the legal regime in force in the state, and the representations made 
by the host-states. Therefore, this doctrine requires to be assessed in a case by case basis. 
It has been argued that little justification has been provided by tribunals to account 
for the use of legitimate expectations in the context of the FET-standard (Potestá, 2013, 
p.88). This is surprising considering the lack of explicit definition of the concept in 
the ECT. However, there is a tendency to define the content of the standard in the last 
Investment Agreements. For instance, the United States-Mexico-Canada agreement 
(USMCA) contains a provision expressly excluding the legitimate expectations to the 
scope of the FET standard (Article 14.6(4) of the USMCA). Conversely, the Investment 
Agreement recently signed between the European Union and Vietnam (see the Investment 
agreement between the European Union and Vietnam) provided a clear definition of 
the FET standard including a protection of the investor´s legitimate expectations in its 
scope. The latter seems to be the rule in the last Investment Agreements, reason why 
some authors speaks about its evolution (Behn, 2015, p.363). This reaffirms the need to 
modify the ECT to make it participant of such evolution.
Tribunals have accepted that the mere subjective belief held by the investors is 
insufficient to create a legitimate expectation (Charanne Final Award, 2016, para 493). 
Therefore, some objective criteria have been identified in jurisprudence to evaluate 
whether a legitimate expectation exists. The following paragraphs identify different 
elements and forms in relation to which a breach of legitimate expectations has been 
found by tribunals. The absence of a clear definition of the standard in the text of the ECT 
obliges tribunals to find mechanisms to define it. What is curious about the tribunal’s 
decisions is the use of some extracts of other awards to underpin their positions, while 
they were rendered under the scope of application of a different legal framework (Chen, 
2019, p.47). This installs the discussion -that will not be subject to analysis herein- about 
whether there is a universal concept of the FET-standard, or if, on the contrary, it has 
a different meaning and content depending on the legal framework it is contained on.
Based on the determinations of the tribunals in the case law analysed in this 
dissertation, four elements can be identified as decisive in evaluating whether the 
expectations of an investor are legitimate (Levashova, 2019, p.51). Firstly, the specific 
representations made by the host-state to an investor. Concerning the representations, the 
analysis will include situations where the investor invokes contractual commitments or 
unilateral representations of the state through general legislation. Secondly, the stability 
of the general regulatory framework will be assessed. Regarding states right to regulate, 
it has been argued that unqualified protection of legitimate expectations may have the 
effect of limiting the state’s right to regulate (Potestá, 2013, p.88). That is why this issue 
will be addressed in the following chapter, as it deserves specific analysis. Thirdly, 
tribunals consider the economic and socio-political circumstances in the host-state at 
the moment of the investment. And finally, the investor’s conduct before making the 
investment -due diligence and risk assessment- will be examined as an element also 
being considered by tribunals.
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Regarding the first element -specific representations by host-state- the arbitral practice 
confirms that representations by the state are, in principle, capable of creating legitimate 
expectations, and thus may be protected under the FET-standard, if they are later 
unknown by the state. Regarding the form in which the state can make those promises, 
commitments, or representations, lack of consistency appears in case-law. 
There are two approaches in case-law to assess the existence of a state representation. 
The first entails the host state to have made clear, direct and specific assurances to the 
investor regarding the specific relationship -which is normally a contract- that the legal 
framework will not be modified. As an example, Charanne tribunal has affirmed that “in 
the absence of a specific commitment, an investor cannot have a legitimate expectation 
that existing rules will not be modified” (Charanne, Final Award, 2016, para. 499). The 
second approach understands that the expectations could be based on assurances of the 
state provided in general applicable laws of a country, or the legal framework at the time 
of the investment. A tribunal is more likely to find a breach of the FET where the host-
state, implicitly or explicitly, made specific representations, commitments, assurances 
or promises on which the foreign investor relied in making the investment.
Some claimants intended to rely on statements by the host-state in investment 
promotion documents, in which it was asserted that high return in photovoltaic sector 
could be reached. Another strategy used by claimants is invoking the legal framework 
in force at the time of investing as the basis of their legitimate expectations (Charanne, 
Final Award (2016) para. 491). Some tribunals asserted that the investment promotion 
documents and the legislation per se could not create a legitimate expectation that specific 
laws would not modified (Charanne, Final Award, 2016, para. 496 & 497). However, 
in some dissenting opinions –in all circumstances issued by arbitrators appointed by 
investors-, a different position was expressed regarding this matter (Gary Born and 
Guido Tawil Dissenting Opinions). It was asserted that legitimate expectations could arise 
from the legal system in force at the time of the investment. An UNCTAD publication 
on FET is used to justify the idea that an investor may derive legitimate expectations 
from “rules that are not specifically addressed to a particular investor, but which are 
put in place with a specific aim to induce foreign investments and on which the foreign 
investor relied in making his investment” (UNCTAD´FET: UNCTAD Series on issues in 
International Investment Agreements II´, 2012).
Thus, it is clear from case-law that not every representation or assurance creates 
legitimate expectations. A certain degree of precision, specificity or lack of ambiguity for 
representations to be enforced under the theory of legitimate expectations is required. 
In this sense tribunals seem to follow the principles set on the ILC Guiding Principles. 
This principles reflect the idea that state’s statement would involve obligations for the 
expressing state “only if it is stated in clear and specific terms” (Guiding Principles applicable 
to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations´, in:<http://legal.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_9_2006.pdf>). The requirement 
of the specificity of the promise is analysed by tribunals from different angles. Firstly, 
regarding the object or content of the promise. Secondly, considering who the promise 
or representation is addressed to. In terms of the content, what is assessed is whether 
there is a promise to maintain the legal framework unmodified. Regarding the addressee 
of the representation, what is discussed is if a promise addressed to a specific investor 
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is required, or if statements of a more general nature, such as legislation or statements 
by politicians or government representatives directed to investors, are able to create 
legitimate expectations. 
In Charanne, the tribunal asserted that the commitment of the state could have been 
made based on a stabilization clause, or a statement directed to the investors assenting 
that the existing regulatory framework will not change. The Tribunal concluded that these 
declarations have not been addressed to the investor. However, in the dissenting opinion 
of the same case, Tawil expressed that the legitimate expectation can originate or be based 
on the legal order in force when the investment is made. The Charanne decision was 
determinant in the change of strategy adopted by the investor in later arbitrations. This 
notwithstanding the fact that in Charanne the tribunal only considered the first regulatory 
changes implemented by Spain. Thus, this case can be distinguished on the facts to the 
subsequent awards against Spain which considered additional regulatory changes. 
According to the tribunals, while in Charanne the regulatory changes did conserve the 
principal characteristics of the investment, in Eiser they did not. Consequently, one can 
easily arrive at the conclusion that the main factor to determine proportionality was the 
substantiality of the loss (Restrepo, 2017, p.101). For instance, in Eiser the investors alleged 
that the decree, which was designed to attract investment, contains a stabilization clause 
(Eiser Final Award, 2018, para. 357). Although the tribunal did not analyse the nature 
of the decree provision –whether it constitutes a stabilization clause-, it concluded that 
´investors must expect that the legislation will change, absent a stabilization clause or 
other specific assurance giving rise to a legitimate expectation of stability´ (Eiser Final 
Award, 2018, para. 362). 
However the Isolux tribunal based on an UNCTAD report concluded that an investor 
may derive legitimate expectations not only from specific commitments addressed 
personally, but also from rules that are not specifically addressed to a particular investor 
but which are put in place with a specific aim to induce foreign investments, and on 
which the foreign investor relied in making his investment (“UNCTAD´FET: UNCTAD 
Series on issues in International Investment Agreements II”, 2012). The Novenergia 
Tribunal concluded that Spain actively promoted the perception of its legal framework 
as stable, transparent, and welcoming to investors through its reports, ´The Sun Can 
Be All Yours´ and other prospectuses creating legitimate expectation that the legal 
framework was not going to be modified (Novenergia v Spain, 2018, Final Award, para. 
556). The Antin tribunal concluded that state undertakings were sufficiently specific to 
generate legitimate expectations for the investor. The tribunal based the decision on the 
stabilization commitment contained in a decree and specific representations addressed 
to the investor in meetings (Antin v Spain, 2018, Final Award, para. 365).
In the cases against Italy, Blusun tribunal states that, in the absence of a specific 
commitment, the state has no obligation to grant subsidies such as FIT, or to maintain 
them unchanged once granted (Blusun v Italy, 2016, Final Award, para.319). The CEF 
tribunal, however, based the existence of investor’s legitimate expectations on the 
recognition letters issued by the state, in which certain fixed price and term were 
mentioned (CEF v Italy, 2019, Final Award, para. 211). The Tribunal also took into 
consideration the agreements signed by the state and the investor; these, even though 
did not contain a stabilization clause, did contain a clause of modification asserting that 
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the only mechanism to modify the contract was by mutual agreement in writing (CEF 
v Italy, 2019, Final Award, para. 214). 
In the cases against the Czech Republic in Antaris the tribunal concluded that “the 
provisions of general legislation applicable to a plurality of persons or a category of persons, do 
not create legitimate expectations that there will be no change in the law” (Antaris, 2018, Final 
Award, para. 360.6). However, in the dissenting opinion it was asserted that the state 
enacted legislation that provided specific and unambiguous guarantees to investors in 
renewable energy guaranteeing that specified minimum tariffs would be payable for 
electricity produced by renewable energy sources for a period of 15 years, being this 
guarantees the instrument by which the legitimate expectations were created (Antaris, 
Dissenting Opinion, para.7). In Photovoltaik, the tribunal asserted that in the absence of a 
stabilization commitment -either contractual, legislative, or individual- it is not possible 
to allege that changes in the law applicable to the foreign investment in question were 
unlawful (Photovoltaik, Final Award, para. 482). 
There is a general agreement in jurisprudence about the fact that if there is a specific 
commitment of the state in an agreement about the freezing of the legal framework –by 
a stabilization clause-, the lack of compliance with this will determine a violation of the 
FET-standard. Nevertheless, when there is no stabilization clause, the jurisprudence 
is divided. The general and less specific the representation is -in terms of content 
and addressee- the less likely to be considered valid to create legitimate expectations. 
However, this element never is assessed alone, being evaluated considering the specific 
circumstances of the case. 
Regarding the second element considered by tribunals when evaluating the existence 
of legitimate expectations -stability of the regulatory framework- tribunals agree that the 
FET-standard involve an element of stability of the regulatory framework. Thus, some 
tribunals have been willing to extend protection under this standard to the state’s duty 
to maintain a stable framework. Often, this has been supported by reference to the ECT 
preamble, which refer to stability of investments in the energy sector. However, certain 
tribunals have asserted that, as a matter of principle, the state’s right to regulate cannot 
be considered frozen or restricted as a result of the existence of investment treaties. 
In Saluka Investments v Czech Republic, one can find repeated statements to the effect 
that no investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time 
of the investment remain totally unchanged Tribunal required due diligence from the 
investor, who ‘must anticipate that the, circumstances could change, and thus structure 
its investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environment’ (Saluka 
Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17/03/2006). 
Eiser tribunal recognized that the states have the right to regulate -including the right 
to change existing regulations. However, the tribunal noted that the ECT protected 
investors against what it characterized as ‘fundamental’ and ‘unprecedented’ regulatory 
changes that led to a ‘totally different’ regulatory regime than the one in place when 
the investment was made, particularly when those changes had a significant negative 
impact on prior investments that had been made in reliance on the previous regulations. 
This right may involve some modifications in previous regulations when necessary. In 
this sense was pointed out that the FET-standard cannot suppose the freezing of the 
legal regulation of economic activities in contrast to the state regulatory power and the 
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evolutionary character of economic life (EDF v. Romania, ICSID CASE No ARB 05/13 
(Final Award) 08/10/2009, para. 217). Accordingly, arbitral tribunals have emphasised, 
in rejecting claims based on an alleged breach of the FET, that: ‘No investor may 
reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made 
remain totally unchanged’. Rather, a determination ‘whether frustration of the foreign 
investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable’ requires consideration of ‘the host-
state’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest’. 
In its assessment of the legitimacy of investor expectations, the tribunal considered 
it pertinent, referring to Electrabel v Hungary, to look at the information available to 
investors at the moment of the investment: “Fairness and consistency must be assessed 
against the amount of information that the investor knew and should reasonably have 
known at the time of the investment and of the conduct of the host-state” (Electrabel S.A. 
v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 (Final Award) 25/11/2015, para7.78). 
For the legitimate expectations of investors to be violated, such new regulatory changes 
should not be foreseeable for a prudent investor (Isolux Netherlands, BV v Kingdom of 
Spain, SCC Case V2013/153 (Final Award) 12/07/ 2016, para.781).
The expectations as to the regulatory framework must be assessed in concreto regarding 
all circumstances, including the specificities of the host-state, its level of development, 
as well as the sector in which the investment was made. However, if an alteration of the 
law has benefitted the investor, then the latter’s legitimate expectations, far from being 
violated, are protected, and enhanced (Tellez, 2012, p.432).
Another element that tribunals consider is the reasonableness of the investors’ 
expectations in the specific economic and socio-political context of the host-state. It is 
obvious that what an investor can legitimately expect -particularly in terms of stability- 
cannot be alike in a developing country than in a developed country. Tribunals have 
considered that the ́ reasonableness requirement´ intrinsic in the expectations requires a 
scrutiny of all the circumstances that the investor should have considered when making 
the investment, including the level of development in the host state. In the analysis of this 
element -which prima facie seems to be objective- is maybe where most of the subjective 
evaluations are made by tribunals.
For instance, the WA tribunal finds that the changes introduced by the state were 
part of the exercise of the sovereign right of the state to regulate tariffs –in particular in 
the context of ´the solar boom´ (WA v Czech Republic, Final Award, 2019, para.576). The 
tribunal also stated that, with regard to the treaty obligation to maintain a stable and 
predictable legal framework, in the absence of an express stabilization commitment, 
changes to address the solar boom were within the state regulatory power (WA, Final 
Award (2019) para. 586. The Voltaic tribunal in the same sense asserted that “before the 
Claimant started its investment project, political and energy sector circles in the Czech 
Republic were aware that the then current Incentive Regime was problematic and, 
because of the solar boom, would become even more problematic with time” (Voltaic 
v Czech Republic, Final Award, 2019, para. 471). The context of the investment and the 
political situation are also considered by tribunals to assess the existence of a legitimate 
expectation. Blusun Tribunal asserted that the expectations were even less powerful since 
it was clear that the incentives offered were subject to modification, considering changing 
costs and improved technology (Blusun v Italy, Final Award, 2016, para. 371). Charanne 
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tribunal, in the same line of thinking, asserted that the investor could have easily foreseen 
possible adjustments to the regulatory framework as the law of the host-state clearly left 
open the possibility that the system of compensation applicable to photovoltaics could 
be changed (Charanne, Final Award, 2016, para. 505).
As emerges from the above exposition, the consideration of socio-economic 
circumstances of the host-state contribute to shape the content of legitimate expectations.
Finally, another element that has been evaluated repeatedly by tribunals in the cases 
under study is the ‘reasonableness’ of the investor expectations at the light of its conduct.
It has been recognized that expectations required to be analysed in concreto in order 
to determine whether the investor has acted with due diligence and thus can be said to 
hold the expectations in the specific circumstances. For instance, Masdar tribunal asserted 
that if general legislation is alleged as the source of an investor’s legitimate expectations, 
such investor must demonstrate it has exercised appropriate due diligence, and it is 
familiarised with the existing laws (Masdar, Final Award, 2018, para. 494).
The rationale behind the tribunals’ assessment is in the idea that not all risks an 
investment may face deserve protection under international investment law. For instance, 
the investor is not protected from the ordinary business risk that any investment implies. 
Thus, the investor must make the investment decision based on a risk assessment, 
examining all potential complications in the investment project, and the political and 
economic situations in particular. In this sense, it is argued that, since the FET standard 
represents a certain assurance to the investor, it does not play the role of insurance policy, 
and thus it cannot protect the investor from all the risks that its investment may face 
(Dolzer, 2012, p.1).
4. Renewable Energy Disputes and State’s Right to Regulate
4.1. Conflict between the investor’s legitimate expectation vs states’ 
right to regulate
According to the ECT, it is unquestionable that host-states have a duty to encourage 
and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for investors. 
However, it was repeatedly asserted in the awards that the article of the treaty in which 
the stability duty is contained does not constitute per se a stabilization clause (AES v. 
The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Final Award, 23/09/2010, para. 
9.3.29). Thus, states are entitled to amend their regulatory framework -which is normally 
subject to change- to adapt it to new circumstances that may appear (AES v. The Republic 
of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Final Award, 23/09/2010, para. 9.3.29). The right 
to make modifications in the domestic legislation is been widely recognized as a key 
element of the sovereign rights of the states (Yaw, 2002, p.21). That is why some tribunals 
have asserted that the FET-standard imposes the obligation to implement regulatory 
changes in a way (Blusun v Italy, 2016, Final Award, para. 319.4). Consequently, a balance 
is required between state’s rights to regulate and the obligation of the state to provide 
FET to the foreign investor (Kudrat, 2018, p.87). After reviewing the awards in the cases 
under study, either the arguments alleged by states or investors seem to be valid. It was 
MARÍA EUGENIA BAGNULO CEDREZ - ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIÓN EN EL SECTOR ENERGÉTICO
Revista de Derecho. Año XX (Julio 2021), Nº 39, pp. 183-216 | ISSN: 1510-5172 (papel) - 2301-1610 (en línea)
204
pointed out that the question on how to balance the interests between both rights depends 
on the arbitrators’ discretion (Jaunius Gumbis & Rapolas Kasparavicius, 2017, p.5). The 
diverse methods adopted to ´find a balance´ between both conflicting rights have been 
the principal reason for different decisions (Rivkin, 2015, p.130).
Different approaches to resolve this conflict have been adopted in case-law. One 
of these consists of the analysis of the circumstances that surround the decision of the 
investor to make the investment. Another consist of the analysis of whether there was 
a public interest behind the measure adopted by the state (see AES Final Award , 2010). 
Through these approaches the tribunals attempted to put itself in the position of both 
parties in the conflict before making a decision. These approaches find their origins in 
the proportionality and the sole effects doctrine (Gumbis, 2017, p.153).
The sole effect doctrine assumes that the host-state has a compensation obligation to the 
foreign investor if its actions significantly damage the economic value of the investor’s 
assets (Gumbis, 2017, p.153). It is being argued that this doctrine does not restrict the 
sovereign rights of the state (Gumbis, 2017, p.153). This is because in case of breach 
by the state of its international undertakings, the remedy is not an order to cease from 
exercising sovereign powers, but to pay the investor a compensation for the damage 
caused (Gumbis, 2017, p.153)).
The proportionality doctrine obstructs the state’s liability if it is proved that the adopted 
measures -in these cases the regulatory changes- were adopted in a proportional manner, 
considering the investors´ expectations (Gumbis, 2017, p.153). This doctrine is based on a 
risk that the sole effects doctrine creates by discouraging states from taking an action when 
there is a need to protect the public interest. According to this doctrine, if regulatory 
changes adopted by states are reasonable and proportional in light of the circumstances, 
the investor has to accept the negative impact on its investment without receiving a 
compensation. Accordingly, the ECT provides that the treaty does not prevent any 
contracting party from taking any measure considered necessary for the maintenance of 
public order (see Article 24.3(c) of the ECT). This provision gave the perfect argument to 
states to allege the existence of a public interest behind the adopted measures and thus 
break the causal link between them and the alleged damage. However, according to some 
authors, the increase in the electricity price does not destabilise the public order and thus 
falls outside the scope of an exception provision, such as the one contained in ECT art 
24(3)(c) (Reuter, 2015, p.12). Correspondingly, it was pointed out that the responsibility 
for the risk of an excessive cost on energy consumers lies in the scope of the host-state 
legislator rather than in the foreign investor (Reuter, 2015, p.12).
The arbitral tribunal may at its discretion apply one doctrine or the other to balance 
states and investors interests in the specific circumstances. If the proportionality doctrine 
is chosen, the threshold for the investor would be high as it has to prove that the states’ 
measures were not proportional in light of the circumstances given. It has been pointed 
out that the standard of FET contains an element of proportionality (Scheu, 2017, p.449). 
The proportionality test consists of three elements: suitability, necessity, and proportionality 
stricto sense (Scheu, 2017, p.449). This three step analysis assumes that the state is acting 
for the promotion of a public interest. Consequently, before analysing whether a host 
state measure can be characterized as proportional, it must be first established that the 
host state has taken the action to pursue a legitimate purpose (Scheu, (2017) p.449).
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Another approach used in the cases under study is the doctrine of margin of appreciation, 
which origins lie in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Spielmann, 2012, 
p.381). The margin of appreciation is a tool used by the ECHR in it assessments of those 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECOHR) and its Protocols 
that require balancing with other rights, or need to be weighed against other aspects of 
the public interest (Frantziou, 2019). Regarding this doctrine, it considers that national 
authorities were better placed to determine whether measures implemented were in 
the public interest because of their “direct knowledge of their society and its needs” 
(Frantziou, 2019, p.1). It has been noted that this doctrine is one of the forms in which 
the principle of proportionality appears (Henckels, 2015, p.1). Notwithstanding the 
above, in some dissenting opinion it’s been argued that the application of a margin 
of appreciation to a state´s FET under investment treaties is not a generally accepted 
principle of international law. Asserting that outside the ECHR there is no place for its 
application (Antaris, Dissenting Opinion of Gary Born, para. 47-48).
The principle of proportionality was adopted by most of tribunals to ground their 
decisions on the cases under analysis. For instance, in Charanne, the tribunal asserted 
that the proportionality of the measures is fulfilled as the modifications to the legal 
framework are not capricious or unnecessary and do not abruptly and unforeseeable 
eliminate the vital characteristics of the existing legal framework (Charanne, Final Award, 
2016, para. 517). Moreover, the investor’s condition of expert in the energy market is used 
as an argument to justify that it should have foreseen the legislation changes. Charanne 
tribunal considered that regulatory changes were not disproportionate since they did 
not modify the basic benefits of the investor (Charanne, Final Award, 2016, para. 517).
In Eiser the Tribunal emphasized the idea that Spain introduced a completely new 
regulatory regime, which deprived claimants from all the value of their investment, in 
a disproportionate manner. Furthermore, it was highlighted that the measures adopted 
by the state in order to be justified require a rational public policy aim and a rational 
act of the state in relation to that policy (Eiser v Spain, Final Award, 2018, para. 418). The 
impact of the measure on the investor should be proportional to the policy objective 
sought. It is noted that the test of proportionality ´requires the measure to be suitable 
to achieve a legitimate policy objective, necessary for that objective, and not excessive 
considering the relative weight of each interest involved´ (Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Final Award, 25/11/2015, para.179).
Moreover, a new approach involving CC has appeared in literature to complement 
the way in which tribunals are addressing the balance of rights phenomenon. Although 
it was not considered by tribunals in the reviewed awards, its rapid growth in literature 
indicates that it probably would be alleged by the parties in future disputes. The idea 
behind this approach is that investor-state arbitration may became a threat to the aim 
of combating climate change, as it may encourage the states not to take CC measures 
to avoid the risk of high value claims as a consequence of eventual adverse decisions. 
Supporters state that tribunals should take into consideration the interaction between 
investment arbitration and CC, since its decisions and arguments may have an impact on 
CC (Restrepo, 2017, p.101). Thus, it is noted that, to a certain degree, tribunals make CC 
law decisions (Restrepo, 2017, p.101). Supporters argue that the sole effect doctrine must be 
considered by tribunals by means of adopting a wide interpretation of representations; 
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less harmful measures standard, and an analysis of proportionality in the context of 
climate change. Consequently, the balancing test must give a proper weight to the CC 
interest grounded on the global intention to lower GHG emissions and the international 
instruments supporting this aim (Restrepo, 2017, p.101).
Another approach followed consist of limiting the existence of legitimate expectations 
to stability contracts or other explicit representations. It has the advantage of creating a 
certainty framework. Either the state creates legitimate expectation by providing clear, 
specific, direct assurances –as it happens in the case of stabilisation clauses- or it does 
not. However, this approach is clearly favourable for the state interests in detriment of 
investors, as frequently states refuse to include this type of clauses in their agreements 
(Cameron, 2010, p.1). Nevertheless, in cases in which stabilization clauses are present, 
the will of the states should not be unknown, being the specific commitment a limit to its 
regulatory powers. In this line, Blusun tribunal asserted that that FET standard conserves 
the state right to change its laws to adapt to the changing circumstances, but subject to 
respect the specific commitments made (Blusun v Italy, 2016, Final Award, para. 319.4).
Perhaps the most novel approach regarding the balance between investors’ expectations 
and state´s rights to regulate appeared in some recent BITs. The Morocco-Nigeria treaty 
which entered into force in 2016 is an example of this (Nigeria-Morocco BIT).  It contains 
a provision in its Article 23, called ´Right of State to Regulate´, which recognizes the 
right of the states to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in its 
territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development. It also 
recognizes some limits to the regulatory powers of the state referring to the balancing test 
in this terms: “the rights to regulate shall be understood as embodied within a balance 
of the rights and obligations of Investors and Investments and Host States, as set out 
in the Agreement”. This BIT is in line with recommendations by the UNCTAD, which 
called for the inclusion in investment treaties for the protection of the environment (See 
the Road Map for International Investment Agreement Reform:  available in; https://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d6_en.pdf, accessed 17/08/2019).
4.2. Role of Stabilization Clauses in Renewable Energy Disputes
One of the main features of energy agreements is that they are long-term contracts. This 
is what makes these contracts vulnerable to political risk. As was noted, the occurrence 
of significant changes in the law during the life of a project is almost unavoidable. To 
mitigate that risk, the common practice is the use of contract drafting as a mean of 
achieving the aim of stability through the stabilization clauses (Mistelis, 2018, p.1). As 
was quite rightly asserted, lawyers pretend to ´Play God´ with contract drafting under 
the illusion that the draftsman can draft away all the vagaries of the future (Waelde, 1996, 
p.215). The principal aim of these clauses is to preclude the application to an agreement 
of any subsequent legislative or administrative act issued by the state which modify the 
investor situation (Kuyper, 1995, p.1)
Although generally states do not accept the inclusion of this type of clause in their 
agreements, sometimes they are used as a mechanism to attract investment. In addition, 
as several renewable energy developments are built under project finance structures 
the inclusion of this clause in agreements is sometimes a requirement established by 
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the financial institutions to granting credit (Lee, 2013, p.1). It has been pointed out that 
“the more stability there is at the treaty level, the less stability is arguably needed at 
the contractual level” (Lee, 2013, p.1). However, this assertion is not always true. In 
the scope of the ECT the stability is generally accepted. Nevertheless, in absence of a 
stabilization clause, some tribunals have been reluctant to accept the existence of a specific 
commitment of the state possible to create a legitimate expectation in the investor that 
the legal framework would not be modified.
In this sense, Charanne Tribunal recognized that a specific commitment of the state in 
the form of a stabilization clause is possible to create legitimate expectations (Charanne 
Final Award, 2016, para. 489-490).  Likewise, Antaris Tribunal recognized the state power 
to modify the legislation asserting that ́ at least in the absence of a stabilization clause´ is 
not prevented to implement regulatory changes (Antaris, Final Award, 2018, para. 360.7).
The tribunal in Masdar concluded that “on the basis of the due diligence exercised 
by the investor, it had a legitimate expectation that the laws would not be modified, as 
they included stabilisation clauses” (Masdar Final Award, 2018, para. 499).
In conclusion, from the reviewed Awards follows that tribunals recognized the 
existence of legitimate expectations because of a stabilization clause.
5. Conclusion 
Based on the reviewed awards it is possible to conclude that investors are entitled 
to receive compensation under the FET provision of the ETC -in the scenario of 
implementation of regulatory changes in its detriment- if a legitimate expectation is 
violated. However, the diverse ways in which the concept of legitimate expectation is 
being interpreted by tribunals and the different approaches regarding how to balance 
investor´s expectations and state´s sovereign right to regulate are the principal cause for 
divergent awards in similar situations.
Thus, the lack of consistency in case-law regarding this matter is, therefore, a fact. 
Similar scenarios have resolved either in favour or against the state. Although in theory 
there is no precedent in Investor State Dispute Settlement, the common practice by the 
tribunals is using prior awards to ground their decisions. Decide a dispute considering 
as the main tool the determination of a previous tribunal seems to close the door to the 
evolution of the FET standard. Regarding this, international investment agreements have 
evolved, including a more detailed concept of the FET standard, comprising in some 
cases expressly references to the legitimate expectations.
The ECT requires to evolve urgently in the same direction. The Treaty does not contain 
a clear definition of the FET-standard and it does not mention the legitimate expectations 
rule. As a tool to mitigate the lack of consistency, a clear definition of the standard must 
be included in the text of the treaty. The way how the standard was recently defined in 
some BITs and the criteria set to balance public and private interest may be a benchmark 
for the drafters of the new Treaty.
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Besides, considering the role the evidence has in the resolution of these cases, it is 
important for the investors to carry a due diligence prior to the decision of investing. 
Similarly, the inclusion of stabilization clauses in energy agreements is suggested at the 
light of the determinations made by tribunals in the cases. 
Finally, the cases reviewed open a new discussion, which must be assessed the next 
years, about the impact these awards may have in the Energy Transition. Although some 
concerns have been expressed about an eventual regulatory chill, nowadays there is no 
evidence of its occurrence. Nonetheless, and due to the increasing number of awards 
decided against the states, if it happens it would not be surprising.
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